Shelter Implementation Plan at the Stage of Radiation Risks Elimination for Public by Berthold, A. et al.
ISSN 2073-6231. Ядерна та радіаційна безпека 2(74).2017 29
UDC 621.039.7
A. Berthold1, O. Kilina2, S. Kondratiev2, 
L. Kuechler1, L. Kutina2, O. Petrenko2, 
S. Smyshlyaeva2, Ye. Veselov2
1 Gesellschaft für Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit gGmbH 
(GRS), Berlin, Germany
2 State Enterprise “State Scientific and Technical Center for 
Nuclear and Radiation Safety” (SSTC NRS), Kyiv, Ukraine
Shelter Implementation Plan 
at the Stage of Radiation 
Risks Elimination for Public
In this article, efficiency of the SIP projects, which already have been 
implemented at the Shelter, are analyzed in the context of the staged 
elimination of radiation risks for public. It starts with the analysis of the Shelter 
state in 1998 before SIP implementation compared with the state after 
implementation of stabilization and other measures and finally with the state 
which is reached after construction of the New Safe Confinement (NSC). 
For the analysis a probabilistic approach has been used. Measures to be 
implemented in the future are mentioned in conclusions.
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План здійснення заходів на об’єкті «Укриття» (ПЗЗ) 
на етапі ліквідації радіаційних ризиків для населення
Аналізується ефективність проектів ПЗЗ, які реалізовано на об’єкті 
«Укриття», в контексті поетапного усунення радіаційних ризиків для на-
селення. Стаття розпочинається з аналізу стану об’єкта «Укриття» 
в 1998 році до початку реалізації ПЗЗ у порівнянні з його станом піс-
ля виконання стабілізаційних та інших заходів та, в довершення, зі ста-
ном, досягнутим після будівництва нового безпечного конфайнмента 
(НБК). Для аналізу застосовано імовірнісний підхід. У висновках наве-
дено заходи, які треба здійснити в майбутньому.
К л ю ч о в і  с л о в а: аварія на Чорнобильській атомній електро-
станції, об’єкт «Укриття», План здійснення заходів на об’єкті «Укриття» 
(ПЗЗ), ризики.
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O
n 26 April 1986, a beyond design accident occurred 
at the Chornobyl (Chernobyl) nuclear power plant 
(ChNPP) Unit 4. This was the most severe nuclear 
accident in the history of the use of nuclear energy 
for peaceful purposes. This accident destroyed 
the reactor core and damaged the reactor hall, the deaerator 
building, the turbine hall and other adjacent buildings. Barriers 
and safety systems protecting the environment from the release 
of radioactive materials from the reactor and its irradiated fuel 
content were destroyed. The main release of about 1016 Bq per 
day lasted 10 days. Activity releases decreased by several orders 
of magnitude after this period of time.
To create barriers to prevent further radioactivity spread and 
to protect the destroyed reactor from environmental impacts, 
a steel/concrete structure — the so called the Shelter Object — 
was built within six months after the accident. The remaining 
structures of the ChNPP Unit 4 are partially included within 
the Shelter Object (hereinafter referred to as “Shelter”). Because 
of the high radiation fields near the destroyed unit, it was necessary 
to apply remote methods for installing structures. As a result, 
the constructed Shelter has acquired certain drawbacks.
The Shelter hazards have been identified by the following 
main factors [1]:
radioactive materials with total activity about 1018 Bq remain 
in the unit, including long‑lived radionuclides without reliable 
barriers to limit spreading of radioactivity into the environment;
the Shelter structures that function as the main physical 
barriers against spreading of the radioactivity do not meet 
regulatory requirements for mechanical strength and structural 
integrity;
accidental cases like the collapse of the Shelter structures, 
or large scale fire in the areas with high level of radioactive 
contamination could lead to significant releases of radioactive 
material into the environment;
nuclear material (by conservative estimation, about 200 tons) 
is located in agglomerations of fissionable material within 
the Shelter, thus providing the potential for a Sustained Fission 
Chain Reaction (SFCR). Water infiltration into agglomerations 
of the fissionable material could lead to an increase in effective 
neutron multiplication factor and, potentially, to a SFCR.
The Shelter implementation Plan (SIP) [2] was approved 
at the highest levels by Ukraine and a broad association 
of countries under aegis of the G‑7 in 1997. The SIP contains 
both short‑term and long‑term actions on the Shelter safety 
enhancement.
The following actions are considered as the short‑term ones:
stabilization of the Shelter structures;
equipping the Shelter with required systems, like 
a modernized dust suppression system, an integrated automated 
monitoring system, fire protection systems, modernized physical 
protection system, a management system for contaminated 
water of the Shelter;
improvement of programs and plans on safety assurance 
of personnel working at the Shelter and on the ChNPP 
industrial site;
improvement of the infrastructure required for the Shelter 
operation, implementation of various activities at the Shelter, 
radioactive waste management.
The long‑term actions are:
construction of the New Safe Confinement (NSC);
determination of the fuel containing materials (FCM) 
management strategy.
The implementation of the short‑term actions (projects) has 
been almost completed at the present time.
The construction of the NSC including auxiliary systems and 
supporting infrastructure is also close to finalization. This is 
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the so‑called first start‑up complex of the NSC. The detailed design 
of the project for the dismantling of the Shelter unstable structures 
(the second start‑up complex) and the design of the equipment and 
the NSC infrastructure have not been developed so far.
The FCM management strategy is developed only 
on a conceptual level and has to be further elaborated.
In this article, efficiency of the SIP projects, which already 
have been implemented at the Shelter, are analyzed in the context 
of the staged elimination of radiation risks for public.
1. APPROACH TO ASSESS EFFICIENCY 
OF THE SIP PROJECTS
The objective of the Shelter transformation into 
an environmental safe system is to ensure the protection 
of personnel, population, including future generations, and 
the environment from radiological hazards [3].
The safety objective will be considered as achieved, 
if the probability and the effect of the radiation impact 
on personnel, population and the environment will be reduced 
to reasonably achievable levels taking into account economic 
and social factors and which will be considered as acceptable 
ones in the long‑term perspective.
The following correlation can be considered as an efficiency 
indicator for achieving the objective on safety assurance 
of the public:
 W/Wр → <1,
where W — the estimated probability of such CE (Critical 
Event); Wр — the permissible (reference) probability of a CE, 
which can lead to accidents with contamination of populated 
territory.
In accordance with the “Design Criteria of Potential 
Exposure Limitation for NSC” [4], the probabilities have to be 
assessed and compared with Wр reference levels separately for 
different density ranges of territory contamination σ. Wр values 
depending on territory contamination level (consequences 
category C1‑C4) are given in Table 1.
Table 1. Design Criteria of Potential Exposure Limitation for NSC
Consequences 
category
σ, kBq/m2
Wр, year
-1
137Cs 239+240Pu
С1 < 0,7 < 0,06 1·10–2
С2 0,7 — 7 0,06 — 0,5 2·10–4
С3 7 — 50 0,5 — 4 2·10–5
С4 > 50 > 4 1·10–7
The criteria on limitation of contamination density 
of territory presented in Table 1 have been calculated for 
a conservative scenario of “typical mixture” of radionuclides 
expected in 100 years (NSC operation lifetime). At the same 
time, the existing assessments of radiation consequences 
have been made for dust and “typical mixture” radionuclides 
activity for present time. The half‑life period of 137Cs is 
considerably lower than for 239+240Pu. Therefore, it would be 
more correct to compare assessments of radiation consequences 
with the contaminated territory limitation criteria 239+240Pu. 
According to [4], the contribution of 239+240Pu to activity 
of “typical mixture” constitutes 0,005 at present.
Assessments of probability of CE initiation in the result 
of individual central interim events (CIE), Wk, and respective 
radiation consequences are given below, CIE is an event directly 
leading to initiation of a CE [4].
The main CIE associated with the Shelter state 
of the following types are probable:
CIE‑1. Destruction of roof or other localizing structure 
(LS) constructions or internal Shelter structures.
CIE‑2. Fire.
CIE‑3. SFCR.
The assessments are based on data presented in the Report 
on the Shelter safety state dated 2008 (RSSS‑2008) [5], and 
in the documents [6, 7].
2. CIE-1. DESTRUCTION 
OF THE SHELTER STRUCTURES
2.1. Assessments of hazards associated with destruction 
of structures performed to assess the Shelter state in 1998 before 
SIP implementation
Contamination level of territories outside the Chernobyl 
Exclusion Zone (CEZ) depends on a scenario of roof and other 
Shelter structures destruction as well as spreading of radioactive 
dust into the air.
2.1.1. Shelter LS destruction by tornado class 3.0, 
drawing in and transfer of dust by tornado vortex 
funnel. The probability of such a destruction amounts to 
10–6/year [6].
Maximum contamination with α‑emitting nuclides outside 
CEZ is assessed as 18 kBq/m2 [5, Table 10.2–44]. According 
to [4], contribution of 239+240Pu constitutes 38 % from the 
α‑emitters mixture. Thus, σ (239+240Pu) ≈ 0,38·18 kBq/m2 = 7 kBq/m2. 
Consequences category is C4.
2.1.2. Shelter LS roof destruction by tornado class 1,5, 
drawing in and transfer of dust by tornado vortex funnel. 
The probability of such a CE amounts to 10–6/year [6].
Density of contamination by α‑emitters on the EZ border 
is estimated as 0,24 kBq/m2 [7]. Thus, σ (239+240Pu) ≈ 
≈ 0,38·0,24 kBq/m2 =0,09 kBq/m2. Consequences category is C2.
2.1.3. Shelter LS roof destruction by earthquake and dust 
spreading by wind.
The  probability  of  such  a  CE  amounts  to  1,6∙10–1/year 
according to [5, Table 9.1–2].
Density of territory contamination outside the CEZ is assessed 
in the range from 10 to 180 kBq/m2 (depending on models 
used and input data on conditions of aerosols spreading) 
[5, Table 10.2–50]. Contribution of 239+240Pu in activity 
of “typical mixture” constitutes 0,005 (see above). Thus, 
σ (239+240Pu) ≈ 0,005·(10…180) kBq/m2 = (0,05…0,9) kBq/m2. 
Consequences category is С2.
2.1.4. Destruction of the Shelter LS separate con struc tions 
by wind and dust spreading by wind. The probability of such 
a CE amounts to 1,3∙10–1/year[5, Table 9.1–2].
Consequences under partial roof destruction and drop 
in the Shelter of the roofing structures (not bearing ones) only 
will be considerably lower than the consequences indicated 
above in item 3). Consequences category is С1.
2.1.5. Destruction of internal structures where FCM are 
accumulated, or which will fall on accumulations of FCM may 
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lead to the release of radioactive materials from the Shelter 
beyond the established limits.
Most probably is that the destruction of internal structures may 
occur in the result of additional impacts during an earthquake. 
Taking into account the high probability of the Shelter roofing 
LS destruction due to an earthquake (see above) for the Shelter 
state in 1998, we can assume that destruction of LS roofing and 
the Shelter internal structures take place simultaneously.
The probability of the destruction of the Shelter internal 
structures can be assumed tentatively on the same level as given 
for the probability of a design basis earthquake, which amounts 
to about 10–2/year.
2.2. Prevention of hazards associated with destruction 
of the Shelter structures due to SIP projects implementation
2.2.1. Implementation of urgent stabilization measures 
ensured the reduction of the probability of a CE on destruction 
of the Shelter LS structures. At that, according to [7]:
stabilization project did not lead to reduction of probability 
of the Shelter LS destruction by tornado class 1.5 and 3.0 since 
the stabilization measures were not designed for tornado loads;
destruction probability of the Shelter LS constructions 
affected by an earthquake reduced to 10–3/year;
destruction probability of the Shelter LS constructions 
affected by wind reduced to 4·10–4/year.
2.2.2. Implementation of the project on dust suppression 
system modernization (DSSM) ensured reduction of dust 
release and air contamination by the creation of a protective 
film in the area under the roof of the Shelter.
At the same time, the consequences of the destruction 
of the Shelter LS by tornado will not be reduced significantly 
since the protective film cannot prevent drawing in dust into 
tornado vortex.
The consequences of the destruction of structures by 
an earthquake or wind can be reduced by about 2 times. However, 
such reduction of consequences will not lead to considerable 
redistribution of consequences categories for the public.
The stabilization projects and DSSM do not have substantial 
effects neither on probability nor on consequences for the Shelter 
internal structures destruction.
2.2.3. Implementation of the NSC project ensures:
personnel, public and environment protection against 
impact of sources of hazards located in the Shelter, with 
probability once every 10,000 years (safe shutdown earthquake, 
extreme wind, snow, shower rain, temperature) and a tornado 
of class F3.0 with the probability of passing through NSC once 
every million years; 
creation of required conditions for practical activity 
on nuclear and radioactive materials management, in a first 
line for the dismantling of unstable Shelter structures.
The probability of the Shelter LS destruction will be reduced 
to an acceptable low value only after the dismantling of unstable 
constructions of the Shelter upper part, at the same time, 
carrying out of additional stabilization measures is possible for 
individual structures.
The implementation of the NSC project has no influence 
on reduction of destruction probability of the Shelter internal 
structures, since their destruction is the most probable under 
an earthquake only. The NSC protective structure will just 
ensure reduction of consequences of such event. Consequences 
category is C1.
3. CIE-2. FIRE
3.1. Assessment of hazards associated with large fire 
for the Shelter state in 1998 before SIP implementation
A large fire in non‑serviced premises with high level 
of radioactive contamination can lead to release from the Shelter 
beyond the established limits.
According to [5, Table 12.4–1], the following initiating 
events can lead to a large fire: lightning, fire at unit 3, water 
radiolysis, and small fire progression. The latter can be regarded 
as the most probable initiating event. A small fire in non‑
serviced Shelter premises can be initiated primarily as a result 
of an initiating event associated with power supply.
Referring to initiating events which led to actual fires 
at the Shelter (basing on which general assessment of fire 
probability at the Shelter was made — 0,2/year), and also 
taking into account that scope of power supply in non‑
serviced premises is considerably lower than in premises 
serviced on a permanent or periodical basis, it can be assumed 
with certain level of conservatism, that probability of small 
fire in non‑serviced premises is approximately 10 times 
lower of general probability, and, respectively, is assessed 
as 0,02/year. Taking into account insufficient level of control 
after fire initiation in non‑serviced premises, it can be assumed 
that the probability of small fire development into large fire 
is high (50 %). Thus, it can be considered with certain level 
of conservatism, that probability of large fire in non‑serviced 
premises is 10–2/year.
Release from the Shelter under fire in the Shelter premises 
compared to release in case of the roof destruction is considerably 
lower.
The exception is the fire with propagation in the Shelter sub‑
roofing space. For this case we will assume that probability 
of large fire spreading in the sub‑roofing space is high (50 %). 
Thus, let’s assess consequences of a large fire conservatively: 
С2 — with probability of about 0,5·10–2/year = 5·10–3/year, 
С1 — with probability of about 0,5·10–2/year = 5·10–3/ year.
3.2. Reduction of the hazard associated with large fire 
in the result of SIP implementation
3.2.1. The implementation of the Fire Protection System 
project (FPS) ensured: reduction of fire loads; fire detection 
at its early stage; limitation of fire spreading to other premises; 
fire extinguishing; limitation of impact of fire dangerous factors 
on personnel. FPS project covers the premises of the deaerator 
stack only, and does not cover the most contaminated premises 
including premises, destroyed reactor vault and premises 
included in the sub‑reactor space.
Thus, probability of fire initiation in the deaerator stack is 
reduced to a low value, but probability of large fire in the other 
Shelter components remains at the same level.
3.2.2. Implementation of the NSC project does not have 
significant impact on reduction of the large fire probability 
1∙10–2/year in the Shelter. Fire detection and extinguishing 
systems in the NSC design are provided only for deaerator stack 
roof and turbine hall containing large amounts of combustible 
materials, as well as for areas around the Shelter.
NSC protective structure ensures significant reduction 
of an emergency release. Consequences category is C1.
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4. CIE-3. SFCR
4.1. Assessment of the hazard associated with SFCR for 
Shelter state in 1998 before SIP implementation
According to [5, Vol. 3, items 9.1.5.8 and 10.2.2.10] SFCR 
is hypothetically possible under the following conditions: 
presence of hypothetical composition in FCM accumulation 
in which SFCR is possible under availability and distribution 
of the necessary water amount within the volume of this 
composition; ingress and distribution of the required water 
amount in this FCM accumulation.
It is necessary to assess conservatively the probability 
of composition flooding with the required water amount. Within 
the period from 1998 to 2008, the monitoring systems of FCM 
state did not register anomalies indicating changes in the state 
of accumulation sub‑criticality. Water amount in the rooms where 
SFCR was hypothetically possible was not directly monitored, 
but indirect factors (including leaks in boreholes) show that 
significant water ingress into these rooms did not occur. SFCR 
requires forming compositions with a size of more than 1.3 m 
[5, Table 10.2–51].
Thus, it may be assumed that for a considerable risk of SFCR 
of FCM accumulation the water ingress must be increased by at 
least an order of magnitude.
According to [5, Vol. 1, item 3.3.3.7] the maximum rainfall 
within 1998—2008 was in July 2000: 172 mm. Taking into 
account uneven precipitations (factor 2) during the month, day 
rainfall may be evaluated (172/30) 2 mm/day≈10 mm/day.
One may conservatively assume SFCR probability as of 1998 
equal to the probability of 100 mm/day rainfall. Day maximum 
rainfall with a probability of 10–2/year is 105 mm/day and with 
a probability of 10–4/year is 190 mm/day [6].
Then conservatively evaluated probability of SFCR is 10–2/year 
(according to [5, Vol. 3, item 10.2.2.10.4]). Radiation consequences 
of SFCR were evaluated as local within the Shelter site.
The above assessment does not consider risks from 
the water ingress from the technological systems (i.e. under fire 
extinguishing), assuming that such risks should be excluded.
4.2. Reduction of hazards associated with SFCR due to SIP 
implementation
4.2.1. Within the stabilization project, light roof was 
repaired to decrease rainfall ingress inside the Shelter, 
in particular to places with FCM accumulations. One assumes 
that the probability of SFCR resulting from this measure is 
decreased by at least 10 times, i.e. to 10–3/year.
4.2.2. Implementation of the integrated automated 
monitoring system (hereinafter — IAMS), which includes, 
in particular nuclear safety control system (monitoring 
of neutron flux and gamma‑radiation dose rate), allows timely 
detection of criticality increase in FCM accumulation and 
injection of neutron absorbing solutions. Due to this, SFCR 
probability is decreased. Taking into account limited possibility 
for injection of neutron absorbing solution only on the surface 
of FCM accumulations, one may assume that SFCR probability 
is decreased by about 2 times, i.e. that considering light roof 
repair to 5·10–4/year.
4.2.3. Due to the NSC project implementation, ingress 
of rain and melted snow will be stopped and there will be no 
further ingress of water to FCM accumulations from these 
sources. Therefore, the SFCR probability will decrease.
5. ANALYSIS OF INDEX DECREASE FOLLOWING 
THE SIP PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION
Probabilities of Wk divided by Wp were assessed below 
in Table 2. Total values of W/Wp were also assessed. 
The assessments are presented for each next SIP project taking 
into account decrease of Wk and W due to the implementation 
of previous projects.
As of 1998, the risks of potential public exposure exceeded 
permissible values by 800 times. This was caused mainly by 
the hazard of destruction of Shelter LS structures.
The analysis results show that taking into account 
implementation of the stabilization and MDSS projects for 
the public:
1. Hazard associated with destruction of Shelter LS 
structures was decreased by several dozens of times but remains 
above the reference values: by 5 times for C1 (destruction under 
earthquake) and by 10 times for C4 (destruction under class 3.0 
tornado).
Table 2. Index decrease of hazard following 
the SIP project implementation
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Initial state
С1 1∙10–2 13 0.5 1 15
С2 2∙10–4 800 25 ‑ 825
С4 1∙10–7 10 10
STAB
С1 1∙10–2 0.04 1 0.5 0.1 2
С2 2∙10–4 5 ‑ 25 ‑ 30
С4 1∙10–7 10 ‑ ‑ ‑ 10
MDSS 
(Moderni‑
zed Dust 
Suppression 
System)
С1 1∙10–2 0.04 1 0.5 0.1 2
С2 2∙10–4 5 ‑ 25 ‑ 30
С4 1∙10–7 10 ‑ ‑ ‑ 10
IAMS
С1 1∙10–2 0.04 1 0.5 0.05 2
С2 2∙10–4 5 ‑ 25 ‑ 30
С4 1∙10–7 10 ‑ ‑ ‑ 10
FPS (Fire 
Protection 
System)
С1 1∙10–2 0.04 1 0.5 0.05 2
С2 2∙10–4 5 ‑ 25 ‑ 30
С4 1∙10–7 10 ‑ ‑ ‑ 10
NSC
С1 1∙10–2 insigni‑
ficant
1 1 insigni‑
ficant
2
С2 2∙10–4 insigni‑
ficant
‑ ‑ insigni‑
ficant
insigni‑
ficant
С4 1∙10–7 insigni‑
ficant
‑ ‑ insigni‑
ficant
insigni‑
ficant
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2. Hazard associated with destruction of Shelter internal 
structures that was not eliminated by implementation 
of these projects became noticeable compared to the hazard 
of destruction of Shelter LS structures.
3. Hazard associated with potential large‑scale fire in roof 
void became the highest. According to conservative assessment, 
this hazard may exceed the reference values (approximately by 
25 times).
NSC project implementation will ensure W/Wp decrease 
to insignificant value for a critical event with average and 
significant consequences (C2 and C4), under assessing 
sufficient tightness of the NSC main protective structure. 
However, there is the hazard of destruction of Shelter internal 
structures and large‑scale fire in unattended Shelter rooms and 
areas (especially with FCM accumulations). Critical events 
caused by these events will have insignificant consequences for 
the public (C1), but due to high probability of these events 
conservative assessment of W/Wp ≈ 2, i.e. the reference values 
may be exceeded. A detailed analysis of the specified hazards 
shall be performed and if necessary measures to reduce them 
shall be provided. These hazards will be essentially reduced 
in case of FCM removal.
Conclusions
The implemented projects within the SIP efficiently 
ensured protection of the public. However it must be stated 
that these projects did and do not eliminate hazards entirely 
like the hazards of destruction of internal structures and large‑
scale fire in the places of FCM accumulations. The NSC 
project ensured essential provisions for the mitigation 
of the consequences of these events for the public.
Today, the degree of these hazards is assessed only 
approximately. It is necessary to perform a detailed analysis 
of these hazards and, where appropriate, to define the measures 
to reduce them. To these measures must be assigned 
the dismantling and/or further stabilization of instable Shelter 
structures.
The above assessments were made based on the current state 
of FCM accumulations and other radioactive materials located 
in the Shelter. Degradation of this state (for example FCM 
destruction, formation of additional radioactive dust) will cause 
correspondingly level increase of the remained hazards.
Important measures are the monitoring of FCM physical 
state and the prevention of their further degradation. These 
measures are also important in view of safety assurance of FCM 
long‑term storage within the NSC. The selection of FCM 
removal strategy depends on observed changes of the FCM 
physical state and therefore such monitoring shall be provided 
at all stages of the Shelter transformation.
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